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CoMBS 1.1. Los ANGELES RAn.WAY CORP. [29 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 19572. In Bank. Jan. 31, 1947.] 
CECIL COMBS, Respondent, v. LOS ANGELES RAILWAY 
CORPORATION (a Corporation),Appellant. 
nl Oarriers-Passengers-Instructiona-ContributorJ Negligence. 
-In an action against a street railway corporation for in-
jnries sustained by a passenger who was standing on the 
second step of a erGwded streetcar when it collided with an 
automobile, it was proper to refuse an instruction that plain-
tiff's violation of a municipal ordinance proluDiting passengers 
from riding on the steps constituted negligence &8 a matter 
of law, where the instruction omitted the important qualifica-
tion that such conduct might be excused under certain circum-
stances. 
[2] Id. - Passengers-InstruetioDB-OontributoIY NegUgence.-In 
an action against a street railway corporation for injuries 
sustained by a passenger who was standing on the second 
step of a crowded streetcar when it collided with an auto-
mobile it was proper to give an instruction that violation of 
a municipal ordinance prohibiting passengers from riding on 
the steps required a presumption that plaintitI was negligent, 
but that sucb presumption was not conclusive and might be 
overcome by "all the circumstances surrounding the event," 
where plaintiff testified that he did not notice the crowded 
eondition of the rear platform until the car was proceeding 
on its way, that he had unsuccessfully endeavored to make his 
way into the car, and that the ear had not stopped when the 
collision oeenrred. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Harold B. Jeffery, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by passenger on 
streetcar when it collided with an automobile. Judgment 
against the streetcar company, affirmed. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, E. H. Chapman and Gerold C. 
Dunn for Appellant. 
[1] See 4 Cal.Jur. 971; 10 Am.Jur. 291. 
Kelt. Dil. Beference: [1, 2] Carriers, § 149 • 
. t 
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[2' C.2d 606; 17' P.2d 2'3) 
Tripp, Callaway, Sampson & Dryden, Walter L. Gordon, 
Jr., Lowell L. Dryden and DeWitt Morgan Manning for 
Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Combs sued to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries, and the appeal of the Los Angeles Railway 
Corporation attacks the judgment in his favor upon the 
ground that he was contributorily negligent as a matter of 
law. As in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn SCMol Di8frict, ."te 
p. 581 [177 P.2d 279], certain jury instruetions are chal-
lenged upon the ground that they incorrectly state the law in 
regard to the e1rect of a plaintiif's violation of a statute upon 
his cause of action for negligence. 
The accident occurred when a streetcar operated by the 
railway company collided with an automobile operated by 
Joseph Commodore. Combs was standing on the step of the 
car and the impaet threw him to the street. Be named both 
the corporation and Commodore as defendants. Each of them 
denied the charge of negligence and, as a separate defense, 
pleaded contributory negligence. 
As Combs explained the circumstances of his ease, late in 
the afternoon, he and several other persons were standing 
at a loading zone waiting for a streetcar. When it arrived, 
he made no observation as to the number of persons which it 
carried, nor did he notice that the rear platform was crowded. 
However, he saw several persons riding on the rear step. 
Be was the last person to board the car. Be reached the 
second step and, after the car started, paid his fare to the 
conductor, received a transfer, and then endeavored to make 
his way to the platform. However, it was so crowded with 
passengers that he could not do so. AI!. the streetcar approached 
the next stop, and while Combs was still on the second step, 
the car and the automobile of Commodore collided. The im-
paet ripped the steps from the body of the ear and Combs 
received injuries for which he now claims damages. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiif's ease, both defendants 
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence by motion for a 
nonsuit based upon the claim that the evidence concluSively 
established that, as a matter of law, Combs was guilty of con-
tributory negligence. This motion was denied. Upon the same 
grounds, at the close of the trial, each defendant unsuccess-
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The jury returned its verdict in favor of Combs and Com-
modore and against the railway company. The appeal of 
the corporation Is from the judgment and from the order 
denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
The appellant contends that the evidence conclusively estab-
Hshed that Combs was guDty of contributory negligence as 
• matter of law because ofhfs violation of a sect.ion of the 
Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles which makes it 
1Ul1awful for one to "ride upon the fenders, steps, or rmming 
board of any street car or vehicle." (§ 80.47.) And as there 
is no con1lict In the testimony that Combs was "riding" 
upon the steps of the streetcar in violation of the statute" 
and but one eonclusion ean be drawn from the facts, the ques-
tion of proximate cause is one of law. 
A further ground of attack upon the judgment is that 
prejudicial error l"8SUlted from the action of the trial eourt 
in refusing to instruct the jury that if it found Combs had 
violated the applicable ordinance, he was gunty of negligence 
as a matter of Jaw. An instruction upon this point requested 
by appellant and given to the jury as modified is also chal-
lenged by the raDway corporation as eonstituting prejudicial 
error. Violation of the ordinance was conclusive, not pre-
BtllDptive, evidence of negligence, since there were no eireum-
stances presented which would justify or excuse' violation. 
Furthermore. the modified instruction was' eon1tieting, argu-
mentative, and misleading. Also. says the appellant, the in-
struction given to the jury was erroneous because it faDed 
to state in specific terms circumstances under which a viola-
tion of the ordinance is excused, but leaves this entire matter 
solely to conjecture without reference to legal principles. 
On the other hand. Combs contends that 'the issue of eon-
tributory negligence was properly left to the jury. Be urges 
that the evidence presented a question of fact as to whether 
he was "riding" upon the steps of the streetcar within the 
meaning of the ordinance and supports the jury's implied 
bding that he was not doing so. 
The instruction given by the eourt on its own motion is 
defended by Combs as being a correct statement of Jaw. Con-
sidering the circumstances, he says, the violation of the ordi-
nance created merely a presumption of negligence, and it was 
• question of fact as to whether the evidence was such as to 
excuse such violation. . 
The ranway company's proposed charge to the jury' reads 
.. followa: "If 70U find from the evidence ••• that at ~ 
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time of the collision between the automobile and street ear and 
immediately prior thereto, .•• Combs was riding upon one or 
more of the steps of said streetcar, then . • • Combs was .•• 
[violating] the Municipal Code ••• and as snch was guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law. If you further find from 
the evidence that snch negligence, if any, contributed proxi-
mately in any degree whatever, even the slightest, to the in-
juries snstained by . • • Combs, then [he] is not entitled to 
recover .•. against defendant ••. corporation. • . ." 
'The instruction given by the court as modification of one 
snbmitted by the appellant is No. 149 of California Jury 
Instructions, Third Revised Edition. It reads: "Conduct 
which is in violation of the [Municipal] code sections just 
read to you eonstitutes negligence per 16. This means that 
if the evidence snpports a finding, and you do find, that any 
party to this action did 80 conduct himself, it requires a pre-
sumption that he was negligent. However, snch presumption 
is not conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence show-
ing that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, 
the eonduct in question was excusable, justifiable and such as 
might reasonably have been expected from a person of ordi-
nary prudence. In this connection you may assume that a 
person of ordinary prudence will reasonably endeavor to obey 
the law and will do so unless causes, not of his own intended 
making, induce him, without moral fault, to do otherwise." 
The court also advised the jury that "a presumption is a 
deduction which the law expressly directs to be made from 
particular facts. It may be controverted by other evidence, 
direct or indirect; but unless 80 controverted, the jury is 
bound to find in accordance with the presumption." 
[1] These instructions present the same qnestion which 
was decided in the Satterlee case, 3'Upra. The evidence con-
cerning the injury to Combs required. first, a determination 
as to whether he had violated the ordinance and. if he had 
done 10, the effect of such violation. The instruction refused 
by the eourt cllieotod the jury to find that, if he did not com-
ply with the mandAte of the ordinance, he could not recover. 
BeoaUII of the orntmnon of the important qualification that 
snob _duct mtlht be excused under certain circumstances, 
the oourt,~ .. ~In.t~"on it was correct. (See Satterlee v. Oro/nge 
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[2] The instruction given by the court was a complete 
and correct statement of the law. By it. the jury was first 
asked to determine whether Combs was "riding" upon the 
steps of the ear. In view of the testimony of Combs that he 
was endeavoring to reach the rear platform and that the 
streetear had traveled only a short distance before the colli-
sion, the fact of violation was correctly left to the jury. (Con-
Mrd v. Pacific Elec. By. Co., 14 Ca1.2d 375 [94 P.2d 567J.) 
If he was violating the ordinance in that particular at the 
time of the accident. the jury was told, the question then to 
be answered was whether the circumstances showed an excuse 
for his conduct. Bearing upon that issue was the testimony' 
of Combs that when he boarded the streetcar he did not make 
any observation as to how many people it was carrying, that 
he did not notice the crowded condition of the rear platform 
until the ear was proceeding on it~ way, that he endeavored 
to make his way into the car but found it was impossible to 
do so. and that the ear had not stopped when the· step upon 
which he was riding was struck by the automobile of Com-
modore. From this evidence. the jury could find that Combs 
reasonably thought that the people in front of him would 
soon move up into the car. but subsequent events beyond his 
control prevented him from doing so. 
The appellant's contention that the instruction was con-
1licting, argumentative, and misleading and tended to confuse 
the jury is without merit. The statements in the instruction 
that violation of an ordinance requires a presumption of neg-
ligence and that the presumption may be overcome by "all 
the circumstances surrounding the event," are neither incon-
sistent nor confusing. In many other situations a jury is 
,directed that, if it finds certain facts to be true, a certain 
conclusion follows; however, if additional facts are found then 
a different determination must be made. The challenged in-
I struetion does nothing more than this. In other words, to 
I tell jurors that violation of an ordinance gives rise to a rebut-
1 table presumption of negligence is to say that they are author-
I ized by the law to look behind, beyond, around and outside 
the violation to see if there are circumstances that justify 
or excuse the conduct. The statements merely complement 
each other. This instruction, when combined with the instruc-, 
. tion explaining the legal effect of a presumption, clearly states\ 
I the applicable principles of law announced in Satterlee v. 
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necessary to decide whether a duty was owed to persons in 
the class of appellant 80 that it could take advantage of a 
violation of section 80.47 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. 
The verdict is an implied finding that, under the circum· 
stances, the alleged violation of the ordinance was excusable 
and it is amply supported by the evidence. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment of aftirmance, but 
as the majority opinion is based upon the unsound reasoning 
in the Satterlee ease, ante, p. 581 [177 P.2d 279], from 
which I dissented, I cannot agree with the legal theory upon 
which said opinion is based. 
Once it is conceded, as it is in the majority opinion, that 
the violation of a penal statute or ordinance by one seeking 
to recover civil damages, does not necessarily bar a recovery, 
there is no common sense or logic in talking about presump-
tions or presumptive negligence arising from evidence of such 
violation. A person involved in an accident may be guilty 
of violating several statutes or ordinances but such violations 
may have no bearing upon his alleged negligent conduct. For 
example, he may be driving an automobile without a driver's 
license; his automobile may not have a current license num-
ber; and he may be operating his automobile at night without 
a taillight and have a head-on collision. Obviously, none of 
these violations can be said to have any bearing upon negli-
gent conduct, and evidence relating to them would be imma-
terial and irrelevant. Even when we consider a statute or 
ordinance relating to conduct directly involved in the acci-
dent, it is first a question of fact as to whether there has been 
a violation, second, whether such violation was a proximate 
cause of the accident, and third, if both of the foregoing are 
answered in the affirmative, whether such violation was ex-
cused or justified. There must necessarily be involved in the 
latter the question of whether or not the person charged with 
such violation acted as a reasonably prudent person under 
the circumstances. If so, he could not be guilty of negligence. 
So the test must be in every case, what would a reasonably 
prudent person have done under the circumstances' Apply. 
: in& this test to the facts of the ease before us, I can perceive 
) 
) 
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no basis upon which the finding in favor of plainti1f can be 
reversed. It was certainly a question of fact as to whether 
he acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circum-
stances. To say that the technical violation of an ordinance 
would bar a recovery under such circumstances is too harsh 
a rule for any court of justice to announce. True, the ordi-
nance was properly introduced as evidence in the case, and its 
provisions are factors to be considered by the trier of fact in 
determining the issue of contributory negligence. The trier 
of fact might have determined that plaintiff was guilty of a 
violation of the ordinance and his conduct in so doing was not 
that of a reasonably prudent person. Such a determination 
would have justified a finding of contributory negligence. On 
the other hand, the trier of fact might have concluded, as 
it did, that notwithstanding the proof showing a violation 
of the ordinance, plainti1f's conduct was that of a reasonably 
prudent person, and he was not, therefore, guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. There is no sound basis for the statement 
that proof of the violation of an ordinance requires a presump-
tion that the violator was negligent. This is not the field in 
which presumptions operate. They operate in the absence of 
evidence of the facts of which they are themselves evidence. 
(Speck v. Saf'tl6r, 20 Cal.2d 585 [128 P.2d 16]; Westberg v. 
Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360,367 [94 P.2d 590J.) Here the evidence 
showed just what the conduct of plainti1f was, and it was for 
the trier of fact to determine from the evidence whether or 
not plainti1f's conduct was that of a person of ordinary pru-
dence. .Assuming there was evidence that plaintiff violated 
the ordinance, it must be considered with the other evidence 
in determining the ultimate fact. When this fact is deter-
mined either the presence or absence of contributory negli-
gence has been established. This is accomplished without the 
aid of a presumption. It was proper for the trial court to 
read to the jury the provision of the Municipal Code of the ! 
City of Loa Angeles which makes it unlawful for one to "ride I 
upon the fenders, steps, or running board of any street ear 
or vehicle," and to advise the jury that it was the duty of 
plainti1f and all other citizens to obey such provision, but in 
determining whether or not plainti1f was guilty of contnDu-
tory negligence, the jury should take into consideration all 
of the evidence relating to the conduct of plaintiff at the time ! 
of the accident, and if they determine therefrom that plain-
tiff'. conduct was that of a reasonably prudent person under 
) 
_ -f 
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the circumstances, he was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
The instruction given by the court to the jury was much 
more favorable to the defendant than that which should have 
been given, and in my opinion it is confusing and does not 
contain a correct statement of the law. After stating that 
"Conduct which is in violation of the [Municipal] code sec-
tions just read to you constitute negligence per "," it states 
that if the jury should find "that any party to this action 
did so conduct himself, it requires a presumption that he was 
negligent." The element of proximate cause is not mentioned 
in the instruction. It has been stated many times, and it must 
be considered as a settled rule of law that contributory neg-
ligence which is not a proximate cause of the accident is not 
a bar to recovery (Pewitt v. Biley, 27 Cal.2d 310 [163 P.2d 
873]; Blanton v. Curry, 20 Ca1.2d 793 [129 P.2d 1]; Bush 
v. Lagomarsino, 196 Cal. 308 [237 P. 1066]; 19 Cal.Jur. 649) 
and an instruction which singles out conduct as constituting 
a basis for a denial of recovery should include the element 
of proximate cause. 
From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that any error 
which existed in the instruction complained of was more favor-
able to defendant than to the plaintiff, and defendant could 
not have suffered prejudice thereby. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. In my opinion plainti« was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. (See 
my concurring opinion in Safferlee v. Orange Glenn School 
Diltrict, ante, p. 581 [177 P.2d 2791.) Under the instruc-
tion given by the trial court, riding on the streetcar steps in 
violation of the ordinance was merel;y evidence of negligence, 
and the jury was permitted to app1;y as a standard, the con-
duct of a man of ordinary prudence rather than the standard 
prescribed by the ordinance. 
The principal issue in this case is whether the plaintiff was 
-riding" on the streetcar steps in violation of the ordinance. 
In Connard v. Pacific EZec. By. 00., 14 Cal.2d 375, 377-378 
[94 P.2d 567], this court, construing the same or4inance, de-
termined that the plaintiff in that case was not -"riding" on 
the steps of a streetcar within the meaning of the ordinance 
if he used the steps preparatory to alighting therefrom after 
the car had already slowed down for • stop but "had not 
) 
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quite come to a complete stop." In that ease the court stated: 
"There is a clear distinction between the conduct of one who 
over a period of time deliberately stands or 'rides' on the 
steps of a moving car, and the conduct of one who merely 
undertakes, after the signal to stop has been given, to use 
the steps in the course of a continuous route from car seat to 
station platform.. The former conduct may be a violation of 
the ordinance, negligence per '6, and the latter not come 
within the terms of the prohibition." Conversely, a person is 
not "riding" on the steps within the meaning of the ordi-
nance, when he uses the steps with the reasonable expectation 
of proceeding directly into the streetcar without stopping on 
the steps and finds that it is impossible to do so after the car 
starts to move and he can no longer safely alight. On the 
other hand, if he cannot reasonably expect to proceed directly 
into the streetcar without stopping on the steps but stands 
on the steps after the ear gets under way, even though he 
intends to remain there only until such time as there is room 
inside, his conduct is in violation of the ordinance. It is clear 
that the ordinance was directed against the use of streetcar 
steps for transportation while the car is crowded even though 
a "rider" may expect to move to a proper place as soon as 
it becomes available. There is greater likelihood of riding on 
streetcar steps under such circumstances than when there is 
ample room inside. 
The uncontroverted evidence in the present ease showed that 
when plaintiff boarded the steps, he could not reasonably 
expect to proceed directly from the steps to the car platform 
without stopping on the steps and that he stood on the steps 
after the ear started with the intention of remaining there 
until such time as there was room inside. Plaintiff himself 
testified that before he boarded the car he knew that other 
passengers were riding on the steps. He also testified that he 
paid his fare and took a transfer after the ear started, thus 
showing the lack of any intention to get off at the first safe 
opportunity in the event he was unable to get inside. Under 
the circumstances a reasonable jury could only conclude that 
plaintiff was riding on the steps within the meaning of the 
ordinance. 
Before a verdict may be directed there must be not only a 
violation of the ordinance, but a eausal relation between the 
conduct in violation of the ordinance and the injuries sus-
VJned b7 the plaintiff. The uncon:flicting evidence disclosed 
. , 
) 
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by the record shows that the automobile struck the side of the 
streetcar and ripped off the steps, including the step on which 
plaintiff was standing. If plaintiff had been standing on the 
platform or in the interior part of the car, he would not have 
been injured. No reasonable jury, therefore, could doubt that 
plaintiff's conduct in violation of the ordinance was in fact 
a contributing cause of his injuries. 
It has been suggested that the ordinance does not provide 
a proper standard of conduct to determine the question of 
contributory negligence of persons riding on streetcar steps, 
since its purpose is to protect the passengers from harm rather 
than to protect street railways from liability. A statute or 
ordinance designed for the protection of the elass of persons 
that includes the plaintiff provides the standard of conduct 
in determining contributory negligence, for "Unlike assump-
tion of risk, the defense does not rest upon the idea that the 
defendant is relieved of any duty toward the plaintiff. Rather 
the plaintiff is denied recovery because his own conduct dis-
entitles him to maintain the action. In the eyes of the law 
both parties are at fault." (Prosser, Torts, § 898; see Rest., 
Torts, § 466, comment f.) The purpose of the ordinance in 
question was to protect the users of streetcars from injuries 
like that sustained by plaintiff. Violation of a duty to pro-
tect oneself, including a duty imposed by statute, constitutes 
contributory negligence. (M eincke v. Oakland Garage, Inc., 
11 Ca1.2d 255, 256 [79 P.2d 911; Koeppel v. Daluiso, 118 Cal 
App. 442, 446 [5 P.2d 4571; see Connard v. Pacific Elec. By. 
Co., supra, at 376; Rest. Torts, §§ 469, 475.) 
Since the uncontradicted evidence I'Ihowed that plaintiff was 
contributively negligent as a matter of Jaw and that this negli-
gence was a contributing cause of plaintiff's injuries, de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been 
granted. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 
27, 1947. Traynor, J. voted for a rehearing • 
